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THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF FAMILY
PARTNERSHIPS*
By T.

BALDWIN MARTIN, JR.**

The elements of family intimacy and tax reduction,' which
present themselves conveniently in the common law concepts of gifts, assignments, and trusts, have proven to be
danger signs which herald the scrutiny of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and forecast probable tax disaster for the
taxpayer. Normally and unavoidably, family partnerships
have come to be categorized with these concepts, and the
Bureau, in its efforts to protect the revenue, would, with
the assistance of the Tax Court, thwart the effectiveness of
these business units in a manner similar to the treatment accorded to the aforementioned concepts.2
*For related work on this subject, see: Olson & Martin, The Cul-

bertson Case, 27 TAXES 777 (1949); Thrower, Culbertson-A Return to Normalcy in Family Partnerships,12 GA. B. J. 7 (1949) ;
McClain, Family Partnership v. Corporation-Income Tax Aspects, 2 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1949) ; Bruton, Family Partnerships
and the Income Tax-The Culbertson Chapter, 98 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 143 (1949) ; Holzman, Commissioner v. Tower-The Test is
Reality, 27 TAXES 155 (1949); Gruneberg, Husband and Wife
Partnerships,26 TAXES 703 (1948) ; Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 788
(1948); Simons, Summary of Family PartnershipDecisions Since
August 1946, 85 J. ACCOUNTANCY 233 (1948) ; Robinson, The
Allocation Theory in Family Partnership Cases, 25 TAXES 963
(1947) ; Alexandre, Corporate Counterpart of the Family Partnership, 2 TAX L. REV. 493 (1947); Tuttle & Wilson, The Confusion on Family Partnerships, 9 GA. B. J. 353 (1947) ; Mannheimer & Mook, A Taxwise Evaluation of Family Partnerships,32
IOWA L. REV. 436 (1947) ; Veron, Taxation of the Income of
Family Partnerships,59 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1945).
**Member of the Georgia Bar, Macon, Ga. This paper was prepared
by the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
LL.M. Degree at Northwestern University School of Law, Chi-

cago, Ill.
1. See Pedrick, Revenue Act of 1948-Income, Estate and Gift Taxes
-Divided

They Fall, 43 ILL. L. REV. 277 (1948).

2. The tax savings to be garnered by assignments were thwarted by:
Lucas v. Earl, 231 U.S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 74 L. Ed. 731 (1930) ;
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 S.Ct. 144, 85 L. Ed. 75
(1940) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 61 S.Ct. 149, 85 L. Ed.
81 (1940). The short-term trust lost both its shortness and sim(187)
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Needless to say, this writer does not begrudge the Bureau's failure to recognize those family partnerships which
are conceived solely for tax avoidance and are dedicated to
an existence of mere ostensible reality.' However, the threat
to partnerships of a family nature, which exist for commercial usage and with genuine business objectives, is obviously
real and it is the purpose of this paper to assist in the search
for that gem of "reality" so recently demanded of bona fide
partnerships by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Culbertson.4

Analysis reveals that there are three eras in the tax history of family partnerships: (i) The "pre-Tower & Lusthaus" period, (2) The "post-Tower & Lusthaus" interval,
and (3) The present Culbertson approach. Each of these
periods has as its basis identical statutory provisions' and

3.

4.
5.

plicity: Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed.
788 (1940); "The Clifford Regulations." U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §
29.22(a)-21 (1943), as added by T.D. 5488, 1946-1 CUM. BULL.
19, and amended by T.D. 5567, 1947-2 CUM. BULL. 9.
The presence of these sham transactions is noted by Thrower,
Culbertson-A Return to Normalcy in Family Partnerships, 12
GA. B. J. 7, 10 (1949).
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S. Ct. 1210, 93 L. Ed.
1331 (1949), reversing 168 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1948).
INT. REV. CODE § 11: "NORMAL TAX ON INDIVIDUALS.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year
upon the net income of every individual a . . . tax . . . ." INT.
REV. CODE § 22: "GRGSS INCOME. (a) General Definitions'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from
salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service, .
of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions,

vocations, trades, busin-sses, commerce or sales, or dealings in
property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership
or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent,
dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on
for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from
any source whatever ...... INT. REV. CODE § 181: "PARTNER-

SHIP NOT TAXABLE. Individuals carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individual
capacity."

INT. REV.

CODE § 182: "TAX OF PARTNERS. In

computing the net income of each partner, he shall include, whether or not distribution is made to him-

. . . (c)

His distributive

share of the ordinary net income or the ordinary net loss of the
partnership, computed as provided in section 183 (b)." INT. REV.
CODE § 3797: "DEFINITIONS. (a) When used in this title,
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the variance denoted by each can be attributed for the most
part to judicial interpretation,6 changes in governmental
economic policies, and, more recently, to a spotlighting of
those partnerships of father, and son and/or daughter composition. 7 It would be neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to examine the implications of governmental economics within the limited confines of this paper, it sufficing
to say that the ever-increasing national debt and public expenditures demand stringent measures in the production of
governmental revenue. Any income-producing transaction
begins and ends with this tax handicap facing it. A further
limitation as to content may be affected by eliminating discussion of the "pre-Tower & Lusthaus" period, dismissing
this topic because its principal importance is of academic
worth.' It is the intent of the writer to restrict this paper
to the present practical aspects of the family partnership
problem.
where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof- . . . (2) Partnershipand Partner. The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by
means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is
carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a
trust or estate or a corporation; and the term 'partner' includes a
member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organ-

ization."
6.

"In the Tax Court confusion is rampant as judges disagree, and
those who agree disagree as to the precise reason for agreement."
Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration,
58 HARV. L. REV. 477, 502 (1945).

7.

This focusing occurred primarily because of the "split income"
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948, § 301. INT. REV. CODE §
12(d). The general effect of this legislation was to do away with
family partnerships of a husband-wife composition and to encourage thosa partnerships composed of father-child members.

8.

The principal "tests" then applied were as to the completeness of
the gift, Lorenz v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1945),
afirming 3 T.C. 746 (1944) ; Munter v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 39
(1945), superseding 4 T.C. 1210 (1945); and to a resolution of
who owned the income producing property. Bacon v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Parker v. Commissioner, 31
B.T.A. 644 (1934) ; Loper v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 164 (1928);
Kelley v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 832 (1927).
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I. THE POST-TOWER & LUSTHAUS ERA
Francis Tower owned 445 of the 500 shares of a corporation which had been in existence some four years prior
to the formation of the partnership involved. Three days
before the dissolution of the corporation, Tower made a
gift of 19o shares to his wife, contingent upon her placing
the underlying assets into the new partnership. Gift taxes
were paid on this transfer which was made primarily for
tax reduction purposes. The Commissioner sought to disregard the partnership and to tax all the profits to Tower.
The Supreme Court, by the use of the standards hereinafter discussed, held for the Commissioner and allowed the
tax." On the same day the Court decided the Lusthaus case"°
wherein the taxpayer had formed a partnership with his
wife, she to pay for her interest partly with funds supplied
by the husband and partly by notes which were to be paid
from her share of the future profits of the business. Applying the rationale of the Tower case, the Court taxed all the
profits to the husband.
In so holding, the Court relied primarily on the insufficiency of services rendered by these wives and on the husbandly origin of their respective capital contributions. Thus
the stage was set for the creation of a formula to be used
by the Tax Court with devastating effect as to family partnerships. An observation of the treatment accorded family
partnerships subsequent to the Tower and Lusthaus cases
reveals the inception and ruthless application of this formula which when stated generally relates that: "Where an
interest in a partnership is donated by a husband (or a
father) to his wife (or child), and the donee performs no
vital services in the business, the income must, as a matter
of law, be taxed to the donor."" A clearer understanding
of the fallacy of this formula can be had by an analysis of
9. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532, 90 L. Ed.
670, 164 A.L.R. 1135 (1946), reversing 148 F.2d 388 (6th Cir.
1945).
10. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293, 66 S. Ct. 539, 90 L. Ed.
679 (1946), affirming 149 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1945).
11. Brief for William A. Sutherland and Aithur H. Kent as Amicus
Curiae, p. 3, Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 4.
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the treatment and usage of the "tests" of "original capital"
and "vital services" by the Tax Court. Consideration of lesser elements indicative of the validity of family partnerships must also be given but their importance during the
"post-Tower & Lusthaus" period was small, being of determinative value only when the question of sufficiency of capital or services was close.
J. Capital Contribution
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court in the Tower
case, 2 stated that a wife who "invests capital originating
with her" has made an adequate contribution to warrant
tax.wise recognition of the partnership. In effect this holding segregated the property interest purchased by the donje
wife from other property interests arising from gifts from
husband to wife. The inequity of this segregation becomes
obvious when it is noted that income from donated property" and stock," to say nothing of trust income, is consistently taxed to the donee wife.
No explanation for the particular treatment accorded
family partnership property interests was given by the
Court. The element of economic control, which is constantly
present in these partnerships, could not be the determining
factor, for the Tower decision makes it clear that capital
contribution alone may be sufficient to sustain the tax-wise
validity of the interest proven. Likewise, the element of
family intimacy is not fatal pet se, its presence resulting only
in subjecting the transaction to a greater degree of scrutiny
than that given those transactions between unrelated in12.
13.

14.

Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532, 90 L. Ed. 670,
164 A.L.R. 1135 (1946).
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L. Ed. 465
(1937) ; Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 62 S. Ct. 754, 86
L. Ed. 1016 (1942).
It has been indicated that the essence of the Culbertson decision
is to place partnership interest on an equal basis with donated
family corporation stock resulting in a similar tax treatment of
the income therefrom. Thrower, Culbertson-A Return to Normalcy in Family Partn'zrships,12 GA. B. J. 7, 9 (1949).
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dividuals." The absence of an explanation for this segregation reflects itself in the Tax Court's decisions which have
followed the inception of this ruling.
This basic fallacy-failure to recognize "gift capital,"
combined with a lack of a logical reason therefor-revealed itself in distinctions drawn by the Tax Court in applying the aforementioned formula. For example, the purchase by a wife of her husband's interest in a partnership,
with gift capital, did not invalidate a partnership for tax
purposes," nor did a capital contribution originating from
a loan to the wife by her brother-in-law prove fatal even
though the loan was to be repaid from future earnings of
the partnership. 7 Further, a gift made without reference
to the formation of a future partnership is sufficient 8 and
the donation by the wife of an interest in a predecessor corporation to the successor partnership likewise suffices. 1' In
15. I. T. 3845, 1947-1 Cu1l. BULL. 66, states at p. 67: "Where persons
who are closely related by blood or marriage enter into an agreement purporting to create a so-called family partnership or other
arrangement with respect to the operation of a business or income-producing venture, under which agreement all of the parties
are accorded substantially the same treatment and consideration
with respect to their designated interests and prescribed responsibilities in the business as if they were strangers dealing at
arm's length; where the actions of the parties as legall'y responsible persons evidence an intent to carry on a business in a partnership relation; and where the terms of such agreement are
substantially followed in the cperation of the business or venture, as well as in the dealings of the partners or members with
each other, it is the policy of the Bureau to disregard the close
family relationship existing between the parties and to recognize,
for Federal income tax purpcses, the division of profits prescribed
by such agreement."
16. Alexander v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 804 (1946). The court found
an essentially new and different economic unit was formed by the
wife's purchase of the interest.
17. Cooke v. Glenn (two cases), 78 F. Supp. 519 (W.D. Ky. 1948).
This holding was based cn the theory that so long as the capital
did not originate with the husband it would satisfy the requirements of being new capital.
18. Lawton v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947), the gift
being made a year prior to the formation of the partnership. For
additional critical analysis of the Tax Court's rule of thumb, see
Brief for William A. Sutherland and Arthur H. Kent as Amicus
Curiae, p. 19, Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 4.
19. W. H. Wilson, P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. I 46,166.
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turn, however, non-recognition occurred where the wife's
purchase of the newly acquired interest was represented by
a note which was paid with the proceeds from a sale of a
gift from the husband 2 -yet recognition was given when a
similar note, to be repaid from future profits, constituted
the wife's capital contribution, 2 consideration of her individual worth being the determining factor in this obvious
disregard of the Lusthaus principle.
A perplexing problem presents itself where the wife invests income from a non-recognized partnership and the
government proceeds to tax the proceeds from this investment to her as the Tax Court allowed it to do in Schreiber
v. Commissioner." It would not have conflicted too greatly
with the "post-Tower & Lusthaus" approach to see the hus-

band taxed on income produced from this investment if the
wife had chosen to purchase anew the disallowed partnership interest, for admittedly the capital originated from a
husbandly gift."5 The courts have not been faced with this
question as yet but the recent innovation whereby the husband-partners give to their wives their complete partnership
interest is admittedly novel. Such a transaction occurred in
Simmons v. Commissioner4 and although it was subjected
to the Tower and Lusihaus treatment, the tax-wise validity

of the partnership was recognized," because "complete control" was vested in the new partners. The possible tax con20. William A. Boyd, P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. 1 46,221.
21. Arnold v. Schepps, 166 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1948). The origin of
these assets was not pointed out nor questioned by the court. Apparently they should have been, for the partnership interest involved here was purchased by a daughter and the possibility that
her properties were derived from a prior gift by her father-partner seems likely.
22. Schreiber v. Commissioner (two cases), 6 T.C. 707 (1946).
23. Alexander v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 804 (1946), wherein the wife's
contribution consisted of capital borrowed from her husband and
income from a non-recognized partnership and still warranted a
recognition of her interest.
24. 164 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1947), involving several family partnerships consisting of a group of brothers and their wives.
25. Non-recognition of such a transfer occurred however in R. W.
Semmler, P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. 1 48,031; Henson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 491 (1948).
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sequences resulting from a gift back by the wives to their
donors of a portion of their interests indicates the lengths
to which this Tower proposition can be drawn.
Fortunately it appears that the recent "revisitation" by
the Supreme Court to the Tower and Lusthaus2' decisions
has cleared the atmosphere surrounding gift capital. The
Court pointed out that, "We did not say that the donee
of an intra-family gift could never become a partner through
investment of the capital in the family partnership," and
"that the amount thus contributed and the income therefrom should be considered the property of the donee for
tax, as well as for general law, purposes." The Tax Court,
relying thereon, has at long last recognized its validity as
well as its proper position as an income producing factor
in a business. This new attitude toward gift capital as well
as the overall change in approach demanded by the Culbertson case, whereby capital is but one factor to be considered
in determining the "reality" of a partnership, is a blessing
to the taxpayer. Nevertheless, it should be remembered
that the importance of capital to the partnership, the time
of its contribution, 7 whether the gift capital involved was
the subject of a restricted gift which demanded its use in
the formation of a future partnership,"8 and the amount of
capital contributed are all elements which still must be
considered in order that such capital be a true indicium of
the "reality" of intent of the partners.
B. Contribution of Services
The comparable importance of "vital" services and original capital was set out by Mr. Justice Black who, after
stating that a capital contribution alone was sufficient to
26. "Revisitation of the Tower & Lusthaus cases in Culbertson would
have been unnecessary if judges and lawyers had read them with
sufficient discernment." Olson & Martin, The Culbertson Case, 27
Taxes 777 (1949).
27. Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1948). The wife's
original contribution of $1,600 had netted her a return of $6,000 in
distributions, implying that the importance of early capital contributions carries over to later distributions, although the importance and necessity of capital has declined.
28. Commissioner v. Tower, supra note 9.
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sustain a partnership interest, pointed out that where a
wife "substantially contributes to the control and management of the business, or otherwise performs vital services,"
this of itself would warrant recognition of her interest."
The recent Culbertson decision has no quarrel with this
"test" except possibly to reaffirm the apparently unheeded
statement in the Tower case that the true test is "reality"
and the sufficiency of services but one of the indicia of such
''reality."
The diverse factual situations to be coped with in determining the existence of a bona fide family partnership call
for certain "sub-tests" to be used in determining the weight
and importance of the service contributed. Examples are:
the importance of the services as an income producing factor,3 ° the nature of the services rendered,3' the effect of the
wife having rendered identical services before and after
the formation of the partnership,3 2 and, more recently, the
importance of services to be rendered in the future.3 Services
that consist of the exercise of managerial prerogatives are
considered "vital" and have been recognized as sufficient
even though no capital contribution has been made.34
As stated before, the weight given services varies according to the business involved. The methods discussed
29. Id. at 290.
30. Goodman v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 987 (1946), involving a jewelry
business. The ill health of the husband, resulting in an additional
burden being placed on the wife, was another factor given weight
by the court. The wife's interest was origioally a gift but the
court found that the services she rendered justified the recognition
of her interest. See also Ford v. Maloney, 68 F. Supp. 1004 (D.
Ore. 1946) (a lumber business); Jay Newman, P-H 1948 TC MEM.
DEC. 1 48,099 (pipe supply & fitting concern).
31. C. H. Cohen, P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. 48,186; F. Byron Todd,
P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. 1 48,203; S. A. Markley, P-H 1948 TC
MEM. DEC. ff48,056.
32. Averbuch v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 32 (1949). The fact that the
wife rendered similar services prior to the formation: of the partnership was not detrimental to her position.
33. Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 4.
34. Benjamin Noble, P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. 48,274 (clothes manufacturing business wherein wife designed new model garments).
But cf. Gil Graber, P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. 48,001 (secondary
services such as entertainment of clients by wife held insufficient).
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above which were used by the Tax Court in determining
whether "vital" services were rendered will continue to be
used, and well they should be, for they are a part of that
"general law of partnership" referred to by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the Culbertson
case.s
C. Additional Tests

Aside from the major elements, capital and services, several additional factors were considered by the Supreme
Court in the Tower and Lusthaus decisions in arriving at
their conclusions. These factors and the treatment accorded them during the "post-Tower & Lusthaus" period deserve attention, since the Culbertson case calls for a consideration of all factors, "throwing light on their true intent. "3'6
Mr. Justice Black, in the Tower case, while recognizing
the legal right of a taxpayer to decrease or avoid his taxes
by the means which the law permits," held that "proof of
a motive to reduce income taxes simply lent further strength
to the inference drawn by the Tax Court that the wife was
not really a partner."38 The importance of tax reduction
35. After pointing out the Internal Revenue Code definitions of partnership he stated: "

. . . This definition carries two necessary

implications: (1) recourse to the law of a particular State is
precluded, see (U.S.) Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.3797(1), 29.3797(4) ; see also Lyeth v. Hoe'y, 305 U.S. 188, 193-94, 59 S. Ct.
155, 158, 83 L.. Ed. 119, 119 A.L.R. 410 (1938); (2) use of the
words "The term 'partnership' includes presupposes that the term
has a recognized content. If this is not to be found in the law
of a particular State, it can only be found in the general law of
partnership." (Italics added.) Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337
U.S. at 751, n.
36. The Court pointed out that "There is nothing new or particularly
difficult about such a text. .

.

. The Tax Court, for example,

must make such a determination in every estate tax case in which
it is contended that a transfer was made in contemplation of
death. .

.

.

"

Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 743.

37. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596,
97 A.L.R. 1355 (1935).
38. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. at 289. Chief Justice Vinson in
the Culbertson decision affirmed this, stating that the existence
of a tax avoidance motive is but an indication of an absence of
bona fide intent evidencing a real partnership.
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as a motive seems to increase as the amount of capital and
services contributed decreases, 9 and, conversely, the courts

attach but little significance to it as a test for tax-wise validity where sufficient services and capital were contributed."
The theory that the wife's awareness of a tax-saving motive
might make her more complaisant with her husband's
wishes, was met with a cold reception by Judge Learned
Hand in Fletcher v. Commissioner,4 and the fact that such
a motive is not an essential element in determining the existence of a partnership has apparently been recognized by
the Tax Court." Seemingly, this test has been relegated to
a position of minor importance except when sufficient contributions of services and capital are lacking."
Prior to the Tower and Lusthaus cases, one common
defense set forth by the taxpayer was the validity of the

partnership under state law. Mr. Justice Black in disposing of this contention, cited Lucas v. Earl" and Helvering
v. Clifford,45 and stated that local law cannot "decide issues
of federal tax law and thus hamper the effective enforcement of a valid federal tax levied against earned income." 4
Conversely, the tax courts have held both before,"

and

39. See Belcher v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1947), listing
as one of eight tests whether the dominant motive for the formation of the partnership was to divide income tax consequences
among the members of the family.
40. Kille, P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEC. 1 47,217.
41. 164 F.2d 182,183 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge Hand, commenting further
on the test of tax reduction, stated: "Why the motive to escape
taxation should be thought relevant, is not so plain; especially
since the court usually adds, as it did here, that a man may in
general arrange his affairs to keep down his taxes."
42. M. F. Horowitz, P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEC. 1 47,153. The court, in
stating that each family partnership turned on its own facts, did
not mention the test of tax savings although large savings were
accomplished here. See also, Quon v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 215
(9th Cir. 1948), a,irming L.H. Quon, P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEC.
47,077.
43. Ellery v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 407 (1944). Criticized in 1 RABKIN
& JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 908B.
44. 281 U.S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 70 L. Ed. 731 (1930).
45. 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554, 80 L. Ed. 788 (1940).
46. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. at 288.
47. Combs v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 1320 (1932). The court, in con-
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after" these decisions, that even though a partnership may
not exist under local law, it may exist for federal income
tax purposes. Except for minor exceptions," the courts have
followed the Tower rule and little, if any, weight is given
to the effect of state law.
The partnership agreement in the Tower case was referred to as a "mere paper reallocation of income," 5 and
the Lusthaus agreement fared little better, being dubbed
a "garment of legal respectability. 1 5 ' The Court, while so
referring to the agreements, gave them little weight in determining the tax-wise validity of the partnership. Such
an attitude still exists, the courts caring little whether the
agreement is written, oral, informal, implied,52 or unpublished,"5 so long as the necessary capital and services are
present. 4
Attention was also given the usage made of the income
received by Mrs. Tower, the Court pointing out that it was
used, "only for purposes of buying and paying for the type

48.

49.

50.
51.
52.

53.
54.

sidering whether a husband-wife partnership could exist under
New Jersey law, stated that it was unnecessary to determine this
for federal tax purposes.
Parker v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 974, 979 (1946), stating that
" . . . the Federal law has its own definition of partnership and
that, in determining whether a partnership exists for income tax
purposes, state law is not controlling."
Belcher v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 1947). Judge
Waller, speaking for the Court, stated that: "Any family partnership that is real, actual, bona fide, and valid under the law of
the state of its domicile is valid for Federal income tax purposes,
and in determining the actuality and bona fides of the partnership
agreement it is appropriate among other things to inquire. ...."
(listing eight factors). And this a 1947 case too!
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. at 292.
Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. at 297.
Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1948), citing
Stewart v. Stovall, 191 Ky. 508, 230 S.W. 929 (1921), and referring to an annotation. 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 972, 973 (1909).
Anderson v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 956 (1946).
Walsh v. Shaughnessy, 77 F. Supp. 577 (N.D.N.Y. 1948); Greenwald, P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. 48,092; Olinger v. Commissioner,
10 T.C. 423 (1948) (although the court found that the wife had
contributed capital, non-recognition followed as it found no evidence of an agreement that the partnership was to have existed)
Jarvis, P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. 1 46,133.
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of things she had bought for herself, her home, and family
before the partnership was formed." 55 The courts have
justly relegated this test to a position of minor importance.56
In a "pre-Tower & Lusthaus" case," the court, in upholding
the validity of a husband-wife partnership, rejected the
Commissioner's view that the wife's use of the income for
family purposes was a mere reallocation of money within
the family and stated, "We do not think she (the wife)
must be required to spend her money in some unusual manner unrelated to her family life to establish the genuineness
of the partnership giving rise to the income.""8 A more recent "post-Tower & Lusthaus" case,59 related the same objection where the wife's profits were devoted to family use."0
The absence of recent decisions relating to this test would
seem to indica'e a hesitancy by the courts to rely upon it as
a determining factor.
The foregoing elements, when considered as a whole,
boil down to a distillate of "reality" as called for by the
Tower and Culbertson cases. The fact that "reality" was
not the gauge used by the Tax Court, it instead using the
fallacious formula of original capital or vital services or
nothing, set the stage for another edict from the Supreme
Court. This was forthcoming on June 27, 1949, in the role
of Commissioner v. Culbertson.
II. THlE

CULBERTSON

CASE

From 1902 .until 1939, R. S. Coon and W. 0. Culbertson were successfully engaged as partners in the cattle industry. During this period Culbertson reared four sons.
55. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. at 291.
56. "It is difficult to see the relevance of this fact, except possibly as
to the bona fides of the wife's ownership of her interest." 1 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 907K.
57. Kille, P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEC. ff 47,217.
58. Id. at p. 764.
59. Anderson v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 956 (1946).
60. See also Lawton v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947)
(household expenses being paid from a joint checking account
built from partnership profits).
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Coon, who was childless, anxiously desired the perpetuation of the-blood lines of the foundation herd of cattle, and
had a deep affection for the sons; upon age and ill health
forcing his retirement in 1939, he agreed to sell Culbertson
his interest in the partnership. This sale was conditioned on
the Culbertson boys receiving Coon's interest. The sale
was evidenced by a bill of sale to Culbertson followed immediately hy execution of a bill of sale covering an undivided one-half interest in the partnership from him to
his sons. The consideration for the latter transfer was
evidenced by a note due a year from date. This was paid in
part by a gift from the father and in part with one-half
the proceeds of a loan extended to the partnership, the
same to be paid from future profits. At the time of the
transfer (in 1939) the Culbertson boys were, respectively,
24, 22, i8 and I6 years of age.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the
entire income for the tax years 194o and 1941 was taxable
to Culbertson, Sr., and the Tax Court agreed."' The Fifth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court, 2 and the Supreme Court
agreed with neither, 3 remanding the case to the Tax Court
for a further consideration of the interest of each of the sons
in the light of a rejuvenated Tower decision. The basis for
such action will follow in detail but a consideration of certain motivating factors preceding this decision will shed
additional light on the full implication of its content.
The first of these factors was referred to by the Solicitor
General in his petition for certiorari in the Culbertson
case as "an alarming tendency by some of the Courts of
Appeals to circumvent the decisions of this Court in Com
missioner v. Tower . . . and Lusthaus v. Commissioner
....,4 The Solicitor, by the phrase "some of the Courts of
Appeals," referred primarily to the Sixth Circuit, and cited
61.
62.

W. 0. Culbertson, Sr., P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEc. ff 47,168.
Culbertson v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1948) ; cert.
granted December 6, 1948, 335 U.S. 883, 69 S. Ct. 235, 93 L. Ed.
125.
63. Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 4.
64. Brief for Petitioner, p. 7, Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra
note 4.
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four cases of recent vintage decided in favor of the taxpayer
by that Court.15 The essence of these four cases is set forth in

the first paragraph of the first case, Lawton v. Commissioner, wherein the court reflects: "If the Tower and Lusthaus
Cases

. .

. compel disregard, for tax purposes, of all family

partnerships, whatever the circumstances of their creation,
or if the Tower doctrine requires that capital contributions
as a basis for partnership interest be ignored whenever such
capital stems from the head of the family, however remote
in time and circumstance, or if the Commissioner is vested
with authority in such cases to comparatively evaluate the
contribution of each partner to the earnings of the partnership, it may be that the decision of the Tax Court, presently
reviewed, must be sustained. If, however, neither Tower
nor Lusthaus announces such doctrine, a contrary result
may be required." 66 Stating thus, the Court then sets forth
the approach complained of by the Solicitor, saying: "...
65.

During this period the Sixth Circuit decided fifteen family partnership cases for the government. Byerly v. Commissioner, 154
F. 2d 879 16th Cir. 1946); Houghland v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d
815 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846, 68 S. Ct. 1515, 92
L. Ed. 1770 (1948) ; Dawson v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 664 (6th
Cir. 1947) ; Lowry v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725, 67 S. Ct. 73, 91 L. Ed. 628 (1946);
Lorenz v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1945), cert.
d~nied, 327 U.S. 786, 66 S. Ct. 703, 90 L. Ed. 1012 (1946) ; Thorrez v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Camfield v.
Commissioner, 154 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Livie v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Ewing v. Commissioner, 157
F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1946); DeKorse v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d
801 (6th Cir. 1946); Greenberg v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 800
(6th Cir. 1946) ; Schreib r v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 108 (6th
Cir. 1947) ; MacDonald v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.
1947) ; Epps v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1947);
Weinstein v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1948). The four
cases favoring the taxpayer are: Lawton v. Commissioner, 164
F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 772
(6th Cir. 1948) ; Woosley v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.
1948); Canfield v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948).
The citator reveals that of the approximately 350 family partnership cases decided since Tower, 40 have been appealed and of
these only 9 were decided in favor of the taxpayer. Brief for the
Respondent in Opposition, pp. 15, 16, Commissioner v. Culbertson,
supra note 4.
66. Lawton v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 380, 381 (6th Cir. 1947).
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The problem thus perceived requires consideration of the
circumstances leading to the formation of the family partnership here involved." 7 A comparison of this Court's
approach and that of the Tax Court bespoke the variance
of interpretation of the Tower and Lusthaus cases.
This variance was noted other than judicially and the
Tax Court formula duly reproached. This disapproval evidenced itself in both Houses of Congress," as well as in
the American Bar Association-the latter demanding legislative action to correct the practices of the Tax Court."
Primarily, the appeal of these groups was directed toward
a recognition of the property interest of a partnership on
an eual basis accorded other property interests. Fortunately the Culbertson decision granted this equality without
the necessity of additional legislation."
Considering the mass of precedent and pressure which
came to a focus in the Culbertson case, a close examination
67. Ibid.
68. See, e.g., Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means (of
the House of Representatives) on Revenue Revisions 1947-48, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 3199-3200, 967-969, 898, 903, 939-940,
3599; in the Senate, Senator Walter F. George (D. Ga.) said:
"The Treasury has very vigorously pushed the cases against the
so-called family partnerships. I think, and I have said so to the
Treasury, and I have said so openly in the hearings in the Finance
Committee, that they have gone entirely too far. . . . If the
husband makes money and pays all the taxes due upon that money,
and if after having paid his taxes he wishes to give his wife an
interest in a partnership business or give her money which she
puts into that partnership business, there should not be laid down
in those cases the narrow test which our courts, I regret to say,
have recognized, to wit, whether the wife actually contributed
anything by way of work or by way of attention or by way of
management of the business. That ought not to have been the
test." (Italics added.) 93 Cong. Rec. at 6071 (May 28, 1947). See
Brief for William A. Sutherland and Arthur H. Kent as Amicus
Curiae, Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 4.
69. Resolutions and Statement of the American Bar Association Dealing With Tax Status of Family Partnerships, Presented to the
Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives on
December 8, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 3344-46.
70. Legislation is not adopted to such a retail problem "where differences of degree produce ultimate differences in kind." Harrison v.
Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583, 61 S. Ct. 759,762, 85 L. Ed. 1055
(1941).
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of its content is required. The decision was emphatic in
opening and closing certain approaches to the family partnership problem and, in so doing, cleared uncertainty while, at
the same time, causing it. Turning first to the certainties
therein contained, it appears that the Tax Court formula
of "original capital or vital services" will not rear its ugly
head at least in that name ;71 the standard now is ". . . whether, considering all the facts ...the parties in good faith and
acting with a business purpose intended to join together in
the present conduct of the enterprise. ' 72 [Italics supplied.]
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, taking his cue from this statement,
went on to state in his concurring opinion "that there is
no special concept of 'partnership' for tax purposes" and
that the "essential holding of the Tower case is that there
is 'no reason' why the 'general rule' by which the existence
of a partnership is determined 'should not apply in tax
cases where the government challenges the existence of a
partnership for tax purposes'.""
The Culbertson case thus set forth that the legal criterion to be applied was the "general law of partnership";
Frankfurter goes even further and explains that this criterion is "implicitly incorporated by the Internal Revenue
Code's definition of a 'partnership'. 74 By citing Cox v. Hick6 the Court
man 75 and Drennen v. London Assurance Corp.,"
71.

72.
73.

74.

75.
76.

The Chief Justice referring to the Tax Court formula in the
Culbertson case pointed out, " . . . Use of these 'tests' of partnership indicates, at best, an error in emphasis." 337 U.S. at 741.
Ibid. Chief Justice Vinson did not however define intent; see notes
89-91 infra, and accompanying text.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 751. INT. REV. CODE § 3797(a) (2), defines partnership and
partner as follows: "The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization,
through or by means of which any business, financial operation,
or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of
this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term 'partner' includes a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or organization."
8 H. L. Cas. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860).
113 U.S. 51, 56, 5 S. Ct. 341, 344, 28 L. Ed. 919 (1885), where
their "agreement, considered as a whole," was set forth to be
the "test" for partnership determination.
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makes clear that the essence of partnership law is reality
and intent, the latter to be manifested by the partners'
"agreement, considered as a whole, and by their (the partners') conduct in execution of its provisions." The basic
importance of the Culbertson case then reveals itself in
the unexplained qualifications given this common law approach by both the Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The former stated as a criterion for determining
intent "the actual control of income" 7 and the latter, referring to the Internal Revenue Code's incorporation of the
general law of partnership pointed out that, "Only in the
application to a given case of the criteria thus incorporated
do economic data become relevant .... "" Clearly, economic
control and cconomic data refer to a more sophisticated
basis for viewing partnerships than that afforded by the
common law and to this writer it appears that the Court
was given a glance through Cliffordish 9 eyes to economic
changes affected by the partnership's existence.
A. Poss'ible Applicability of the Clifford Doctrine
The Clifford case or its doctrine was mentioned six times
by the Chief Justice in his majority opinion. Whether this
constituted an inferential attempt to bring family partnership determinations under the "dominion and control" approach of the Clifford line of cases8" is not clear, it apparently being the objective of the Court to point out that
dominion and control are but elements to be considered in
determining "reality." Unfortunately the facts with which
the Court was working did not lend themselves to a ready
resolution of this question, for the record reveals that the
partnership interests of the Culbertson boys would not
have passed through Culbertson, Sr., except for Coon's
77.
78.
79.
80.

Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742.
Id. at 751.
See Helvering v. Clifford, supra note 45.
Helvering v. Clifford, 3C9 U.S. 331, 336-7, 60 S. Ct. 554, 557, 80
L. Ed. 788 (1940). The Court pointed out that a failure to consider dominion and control "

. . . would be to treat the wife

as a complete stranger; to let mere formalism obscure the normal
consequences of family solidarity; and to force concepts of ownership to be fashioned out of legal niceties which may have little
or no significance in such household arrangements."
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affection for these boys. Furthermore, Culbertson, Sr., had
no more or no less an interest subsequent to completion of
the two related sales than he did prior to them. The "practical" approach of taxation can leave no logical answer but
that such economic change as was affected by the sales accrued to the Culbertson boys."'
The most logical explanation for the repeated reference
to the Clifford case would appear to be that the Court
realized that it was joining the common law and the Internal Revenue Code and that such a union left certain
elements to be desired from the tax standpoint. Admittedly,
the common law approach used to determine partnership
existence was not conceived with an eye toward tax implications. And both the Tower and Culbertson cases showed
concern because of this. " The fallacy of basing tax-wise
existence purely on the common law is made plain by the
numerous partnerships which have been recognized by state
courts, which make determinations primarily from a codification of general laws, the same partnerships later being
refused tax recognition by the federal courts.83 The interjection of Cliffordism thus appears to be for the purpose of
adding an additional element to test objectively the true
"intent" necessary.
Chief Justice Vinson presented another certainty in stating that, "The intent to provide money, goods, labor, or
skill sometime in the future cannot meet the demands of
Sections i i and 22 (a)" of the Code that he who presently
81.

An additional indication of reality can be drawn from the fact
that partnership liability arising in a civil matter would affect
the economic interest of each of the partners, not that of Culbertson, Sr. alone.

82. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring specially in Culbertson
states: "Congress has thereby stamped a nationwide meaning
upon the term (partnership) which disregards minor local variants or an occasional legal sport." (Italics added.) 337 U.S. at 751.

83. This procedure was demonstrated in the Culbertson case whereby
Culbertson, Sr. employed one Stallcup, who filed suit for the four
Culbertson boys against Culbertson, Sr. in the District Court of
Dallam County, Texas and, after a hearing, that Court returned
a judgment that the partnership was valid in all things. Brief for
the Respondents, p. 13, Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 4.
84. INT. REV. CODE §§ 11, 22(a).
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earns the income through his own labor and skill and the
utilization of his own capital be taxed therefor." ' This
principle of law was directed at the Fifth Circuit's statement that a present partnership interest can be sustained by
a future rendition of services and/or capital." The basis
for the Circuit Court's statement is not clear, for it had
recognized the validity of the capital contribution of the
boys and in effect it built a straw man which the Chief
Justice took to task. As a practical matter, the Court agreed
with the Fifth Circuit as to the tax-wise recognition of
string-free capital.8 7
One question left unanswered by the Court is whether a
combination of present gift capital plus an agreement to
render future services will suffice to warrant tax-wise recognition. Assuming the eixstence of a partnership with income arising in equal proportion from capital and services,
and applying the "reality" approach, realistic intent could
be implied automatically from the existence of the capital,
the responsibility for loss,8" the agreement to render future
services, 89 and the subjective intent of the parties. Conversely, unrealistic intent is implied by the absence of present services, lack of economic control, absence of managerial
prerogatives, and the family intimacy involved. Conceiv85.

86.

87.

88.
89.

Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 740. The Chief Justice by
way of clarification further stated: "The vagaries of human experience preclude reliance upon even good faith intent as to future
conduct as a basis for the present taxation of income." See Tinkoff
v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941).
Mr. Justice Burton concurring in the Culbertson case felt similarly inclined, pointing out that a present commitment to render
future services to a partnership is a factor to be weighed with
other indicia when determining the existence of a partnership.
Theurkauf v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 529 (1949). A wife's contribution of gift capital was held to be sufficient as property belonging to her, the Court therein relying on the Culbertson decision.
See note 81 supra.
A reconciliation may be drawn between the Chief Justice's distaste for future services as evidenced by his reprimand of the
Fifth Circuit, note 86 supra, and accompanying text, and Justice
Burton's apparent acceptance of it in his concurring opinion as
the latter relegates these services to the position of a factor "to
be considered."
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ably the Tax Court could hold for or against the taxpayer
and justify either position. If the test be "subjective" intent, then the Court would have no alternative but to recognize the partnership; however, if "objective" intent, as evidenced by the indicia of services, time devoted to the business, and so forth, then non-recognition would probably result. The present Tax Court has apparently interpreted
necessary intent to be "objective" intent. In a post-Culbertson decision decided on this basis, it found the requisite intent absent and termed the gift-capital contribution "mere
camouflage." ' This "objective intent" interpretation is
justified especially in view of the classic statement relating
to subjective intent which points out "that the state of a
man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion."'"
B. Probable Disposition
Perceiving thus the implications of "intent" as called
for by the Supreme Court as well as the "economic reality"
qualification of the "general law" approach, an additional
evaluation of the content of the Culbertson case may be
gained by looking ahead to the probable decision of the
Tax Court as to each of the four sons. The age range presented by the Culbertson boys during the tax years in question varies from late adolescence to manhood, from a lad
of high school age to a man with the responsibility of a
family. This variance lends itself to a consideration of a
relatively new element in family partnership law-this being the historical practice of a father creating a future for
his child and sharing it with him. 2
90. Harmon v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 373 (1949). The Court there
recognized the partnership interest of the taxpayer's son, refusing to recognize that of his wife primarily because of insufficient
services.
91. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1884).
92. "The desire of a father in any age or clime, with a business that
he cherishes and a son that he loves, to have such son with him
in his business and to carry it on when he no longer can, was not
rendered an anathema by the Lusthaus and Tower cases, and
aberrations from the salutary rules announced in these cases
should not now do so." Culbertson v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 979,
984 (5th Cir. 1948).
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Before predicting the ultimate tax treatment of the parties of the Culbertson case, it is desirable to consider an
important factual variance between the Tower and Culbertson cases since the affirmation in the latter decision of the
former case demands applicability of the Tower doctrine
in the determination of these boys' interest. 3 Tower concerned itself with a husband-wife relation, an economic
unit bound to continue in existence till death or divorce;
Culbertson pivots on a father-son combination, this remaihing a single economic unit only until independence is gained
by the boys. In the Culbertson case (in 1940) two of the
boys were married and one of the remaining two was fast
approaching marital age." This presents a vastly different
factual situation from that of Tower, for here we have not
one but three families involved, with the prospect of two
more to come. The age differential between Tower and his
wife, and Culbertson and his boys, is also a distinguishing
feature of determinative importance.
The glaring inadequacy of a reconciliation between the
Tower and Culbertson cases thus becomes apparent; admittedly the Tower decision is applicable, but this applicability
is not sufficient.15 It would appear to be plausible and just

to add, to the principal determinative factors of "capital"
and "services," the element of this father-son relationship
and to give it equal weight in ascertaining the necessary "intent." Such a relationship is historically and practically realistic-this realism is strengthened by the fact that the longer the partnership remains in effect the greater the "economic dominion and control" flowing to the son-partner. A
tendency to follow the above-given line of reasoning is being evidenced by the courts, and in all probability the Tax
Court will give close consideration to this factor in its final
determination of the Culbertson case.
93. See note 26 supra.
94. Apparently the age of these two boys is not too detrimental; see
Green v. Arnold, 87 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1949), wherein taxpayer's 14-year-old daughter was recognized as a partner. The
intent of the parties was held controlling.
95. As a matter of fact this problem was not dealt with by the
Culbertson decision directly.
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In 1940, W. 0. Culbertson, Jr., was twenty-four years
of age, and married; Richard was twenty-two, and married; Joe Jack was eighteen; and Eugene was sixteen. These
boys, aside from the services rendered by each, had certain
technical indicia of partnership membership which deserve
attention as elements "throwing light on their true intent."
The partnership agreement, business custom,"6 prior training in the cattle business, the condition of the sale by Coon
to their father (i.e., that the boys receive his interest) a
partnership bank account upon which all could check, advertisement of the existence of the new partnership prior to
the tax questions being raised, and absence of a tax reduction motive, and the issuance of a certificate to the new partnership by the American Hereford Association, are all factors deserving consideration and demanding weight in the
final decision as to each son.
W. 0., Jr., upon the organization of the new partnership,
became manager of the ranch. In that capacity, "he had
charge and handled all ranching activities .. .including the
formulation and execution of the breeding program, the
hiring and firing and supervising of all employees, the payment of all ranch expenditures, and the feeding and care
of the cattle.""7 Culbertson, Sr., did not instruct W. 0., Jr.,
in the operation of the ranch and, in fact, visited the ranch
on the average of only once a month, while W. 0., Jr., lived
there at all times with his family." There would appear to
be little doubt as to the genuineness of this son's interest,
for with his capital contribution, services, duties, and his
exercise of managerial prerogatives as to policy and the
actual operation of the ranch, he is admittedly an invaluable portion of this business' existence. W. 0., Jr., being
96.

In respondent's brief it was pointed out that approximately ten
per cent of the loans made by the company which executed the
loan in favor of W. 0. Culbertson & Sons were made to father
and son cattle-partnerships. Brief for the Respondents, p. 18,
Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 4.
97. Id. at p. 15.
98. Id. at p. 9, wherein it was pointed out that Culbertson, Sr. was to
be in charge of office work consisting, "of maintaining contracts
with prospective customers, buying and selling cattle and arranging loans to carry on partnership operations."
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the eldest son and a principal income producing factor,
occupies the most promising position of all the sons and,
no doubt, the Tax Court will recognize the "reality" of his
interest.
Richard does not present as inviting a picture of "reality"
as W. 0., Jr., because of an absence of services rendered.
After the formation of the partnership, he continued in
college until May, 1941, at which time he went directly
into the Army. The only services rendered by him during
the tax years in question were in the Summer and Fall of
1940. During this time he worked under the direction of
W. 0., Jr., doing general work which included certification
or offspring, preparation of registry papers, and participation in the formulation of policy. Apparently the failure of
Richard to render services because of military duty is not
detrimental, 9 the determining factor being whether he was
a partner prior to his induction into the Army.'"
Combining the aforementioned technical indica applicable
to all the boys with the valid capital contributions, it would
seem that the Tax Court could well recognize Richard as
a partner. The additional elements of economic gain accruing to him at the partnership's inception, his marital status,
his control over partnership income, his prior training in
the cattle busness, his rendition of services and probable
rendition of future services, all combine to present a picture
of reality. This becomes more apparent in view of recent
post-Culbertson decisions which reflect a more liberal attitude toward family partnerships, especially toward those of
99.

See Beasle'y v. Henslee, 5 P-H 1949 FED. TAX SERV. ff 72, 704; there
the Court in its charge to the jury stated, "You are further in-

structed that the partnership is not rendered invalid because a
son is called into the army or because a daughter marries, and

due to these circumstances, the son or the daughter, as the case
may be, is not able to render the same services which he or she
had been rendering."

100. Referring to a son-partner who was in the Naval Air Corps, Harmon v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 373 (1949),

the Court held that

since he had acquired the status of a partner prior to his entry
into military service he was not divested of it because of such
action.
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father-son composition."'
Joe Jack, and Eugene occupy the least enviable positions
of the four boys. Because of their youth, the Tax Court,
proceeding under the "economic change" approach, may
find that no "real" economic change occurred, these boys remaining dependent on their father and he controlling their
interests and making their decisions. Such a holding would
be strengthened by the absence of services on the part of
these boys. On the other hand, their age would not necessarily destine them to non-recognition as partners 2 nor
would their absence of services, if it be shown that their
schooling constituted training in the business of the partnership." 3 In the event that non-recognition is accorded to the
interests of these two, they can at least anticipate probable
future recognition which would be based on increased ages
bringing about an economic split denoting financial independence and a mature influence in policy making for the
partnership.'
III.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The factual variances inherent in family partnerships
do not lend themselves to an open and shut solution to the
problems heretofore presented. Certain measures, however, can be taken whereby a great assurance of tax-wise
recognition can be had.
101. Depue v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 463 (1949) ; Middlebrook v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 385 (1949) ; Schnitzer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.
43 (1949) ; Harmon v. Commissioner, supra note 100; Crosley v.
Campbell, 87 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1949); Glenn v. Cooke, 177
F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1949). All of these cases evidence taxpayer liberality predicated primarily on the Culbertson decision.
102. See note 94 supra.
103. Crosley v. Campbell, 87 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1949), wherein the
son's partnership interest was recognized partially because after
formation of the partnership he pursued a course of studies to
aid him in the operation of the business.
104. Harmon v. Commissioner, supra note 100. The Court there predicated its recognition of the 16-year-old-son-partner partially on
his exercise of managerial prerogatives. The Court pointed out,
however, that it was cognizant of the weight of the boy's "words."
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The Simmons case,"' wherein the husband-partners made
a complete gift of their respective interests to their wives,
is a drastic solution, but its applicability in a Culbertson
situation is one possible out. The economic problem of caring for Culbertson, Sr., could be solved by hiring him on a
salary basis in order to take advantage of his cattle "know
how." The weakness of this method, aside from its patent
impracticability and limitation of usage, is that the father
would constantly be under pressure not to exercise control
and influence not commensurate with his position as an employee.
A more practical plan, especially where a father desires to assist his young children who do not possess sufficient business acumen, is the creation of a partnership composed of a father-settlor and the trustees of a family trust.
These partnerships are generally created by a gift, in trust,
of an interest in an individual proprietorship followed by
the execution of articles of partnership between the settlor
and the trustees, each contributing his interest in the business. As demonstrated by pre-Culbertson decisions, the
treatment accorded these partnerships is that given the
usual family partnership. The basic fallacy of these units
prior to the Culbertson holding was that no "original" capital existed, and the cases dealing therewith reflected animosity evolving from this weakness.'
More recently, however, the Eighth Circuit, just prior to
the Culbertson decision, recognized a partnership composed
of six trusts, the settlor, and his son-the father and the son
were co-trustees along with a bank, of the six trusts."°7 It is
of importance that the bank exercise no managerial powers
and occupied the position of a "naked" trustee. The Court,
while recognizing the gift capital, in trust form, pointed out
that the trusts were genuine, that no tax reduction motive
105. Simmons v. Commissioner, supra note 24.
106. Economos v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Kohl v.
Commissioner, 170 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1948).
107. Thompson v. Riggs, 175 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1949). The Court pointed out that the trusts were "legal," and the Commissioner apparently did not proceed on the basis of the invalidity of the trusts
involved.
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was present, that a change in management took place, and
that a complete change in the taxpayer's economic status
occurred. The impact of this decision, together with the
Culbertson edict to recognize gift capital, places these
settlor-trustee partnerships in a favorable position for
recognition. Needless to say, the trustee must be more than
a figurehead and must render services commensurate with
his economic position.
The basic weakness of this trustee-settlor partnership is
that the vulnerability of the partnership to non-recognition
is doubled by the trust element, which invites the scrutiny
of the "Clifford Regulations ' as well as Sections i66 and
167.1"' Thus far, no decision reveals that the Commissioner

has taken advantage of this dual approach, but it is to be
anticipated, since the question of control by the settlorpartner is ever present, as is the fact that a portion of the
trust income may well be distributed or used for the support of the trust beneficiaries.110
A. The 4llocation Theory
From the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the
advocates of family partnerships and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, there has been a slow evolution of a compromise. It has taken the form of an allocation of income
dependent upon the proportionate amounts of capital and
services contributed by the individual partners. As is true
with most compromises, this one involved a give and take
relationship-the taxpayer losing his battle for a 5o-5o
division of profits, and the Bureau manifesting a softer attitude toward the existence of family partnerships."' As the
108. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-21 (1943), as added by T.D.5488,
1946-1 CUM. BuLL. 19, and as amended by T.D. 5567, 1947-2 CUM,
BULL. 9.
109. INT. REV. CODE §§ 166-167. It is of interest that merely because a
person is not taxable under one approach he is not precluded from
being taxed on the identical subject matter by another approach.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21.
110. INT. REV. CODE § 167(c), taxes trust income to the settlor where
such income is used for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the settlor is legally obligated to support.
111. Note 15 supra, implies a recognition of partnerships which do not
quite measure up to the Tower and Lusthaus requirements.
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conflict between these parties has raged to a great extent
within the courts, it follows that the actual application of
such a compromise should take place there.
What might well be called the birth of the Allocation
Theory came in i943 in German v. Commissioner." 2 In
what has been referred to as an "abortive beginning,"".3 the
Tax Court, acting on its own initiative,"' allotted the income of the partnership on a 75%-25% basis, thus giving
recognition to the value of the wife's capital contribution
in a business primarily demanding personal service. Two
years later, the question was placed before the Tax Court
in William J. Hirsch,"' wherein the Commissioner admitted the existence of the partnership in question but proposed a method for determining the respective shares of the
partnership. This method contemplated an allowance being made for "salaries," and an allocation of the remainder
on the basis of capital contributions. The court disregarded
such a plan and held that once a partnership is recognized,
any agreement existing between the parties must be respected." 6
Since the Hirsch case, the allocation approach has fared
better, and its potentialities have been given a little more
widespread approach. In Canfield v. Commissioner,"' a
112.2 T.C. 474 (1943). The court made a 25%-75% allocation on the
basis of the wife's services and small capital contribution.
113. Robinson, The Allocation Theory in Family PartnershipCases, 25
TAXES 963 (1947).
114. Allocation was not requested by the taxpa'yer or the Commissioner.
115. P-H 1945 TC MEM. DEC. 1 45,002.
116. Commenting on the Hirsch case, Polisher, Family Partnerships
Under Federal Income Taxation, 23 TAXES 815 (1945): "The allocation of income attack on family partnerships suffered a doleful
fate at the hands of the tax court, which rejected it, but the allocation approach continues to be pressed with unrelenting vigor."
117. 7 T.C. 944 (1946). The taxpayer appealed this decision and the
Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's holding. Canfield v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 907, 913 (6th Cir. 1948). This Court found
the partnership valid for tax purposes but felt that the Tax Court
had erred in disregarding the division agreed on in the partnership agreement. In holding that the tax burden be placed in accordance with the agreed division it stated, "In the circumstances
of this case the Tax Court had no lawful right for income tax pur-
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case of "post-Tower & Lusthaus" vintage, the Court, in
what seemed a rather arbitrary manner, attributed 75% of
the income to the services of the husband, and ruled that
the remaining 25% was subject to allocation in a proportion to be determined by the relative amounts of capital
contributed. In so holding, the Court disregarded the partnership agreement which stated that profits and losses were
to be equally shared. A later case, Jennings v. Commissioner,"8 involving a husband-wife and son partnership, the
Court found that the son's contribution of services was
sufficient to justify the agreed 25% share, but that because
the wife's contribution consisted only of capital, an allocation must be made on the basis of such contribution only
after a $I5,ooo deduction for salary for the husband had
been made. Such a bias toward capital does not oft demonstrate itself. The giving of a salary before the making of an
allocation is apparently the present course of the courts"'
and, as might be expected, a mathematically inclined judge
has reduced the process to a formula. This formula, as set
forth in L. B. Hartz,"' consists of a division of the capital
contribution by the net worth of the business, multiplied by
the net income minus the salary paid in lieu of services.
Thus far, the cases involving allocation have dealt primarily with situations wherein the wife has contributed only
capital and no services. The Court had an opportunity to
clarify the picture as to services and their effect on allocation in the Jennings case, but it successfully avoided the
issue. Consideration of such a contingency is taken by the
Bureau in its statement of policy regarding family partnerposes to make a new contract for the parties." For a critical analysis of the Tax Court decision, see Robinson, supra note 113, at
967.
118.10 T.C. 505 (1948).
119. Ford v. Maloney, 68 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ore. 1946). The Court followed the division set forth in the partnership agreement, to wit,
a 25% share of the profits to be first paid to the husband as a
salary, and an equal division of the remaining 75%.
120. P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEC. 1 47,121, rev'd, 179 F.2d 313 (8th Cir.
1948). The Court remanded the cause back to the Tax Court for
a recomputation of the alleged tax.
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ships.' Therein it points out that allocation should be made
as to capital and services once the partnership existence is
established. The task, in any case, of determining just how
much income is derived from the separated elements of capital and personal services presents obvious difficulties, and
these difficulties are made even more apparent when two or
more parties contribute the services and capital."2 However, the task of computing a "reasonable" salary for a
corporate officer"2 has not proved too formidable, and a
determination of when a corporation's surplus should be
subjected to the penalty tax of Section 10212' has also been
accomplished.
Basically, the allocation theory, for all its administrative
difficulty, reaches an equitable and desirable result that bespeaks reality in its essence. Unfortunately, various appellate courts have found cause to disagree with the allocation
theory primarily because, "In the absence of an agreement
showing a different intention, partners will be held to share
equally in both profits and losses. This rule is not changed
by the fact that one partner's contribution of time and skill
is greater than that of the other."'' The Sixth Circuit,
which might be designated the "thorn in the side" of allocation, admits of situations demanding allocation but does
121. See note 15 supra.
122. "If this is to be the established procedure of the Tax Court, it will
be adding a flood of tax litigation to already swollen waters. It
will tend to serve as an unsettling potion and will cause many
such issues to remain unresolved in the stages of negotiation between the taxpayer and the Bureau prior to invoking the jurisdiction of the Tax Court." Polisher, Family Partnership,23 TAXE3
46 (1945).
123. Kennedy Name Plate Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.
1948).
124. INT. REV. CODE § 102 (a), imposes a penalty tax on earnings accu-

mulated by corporations for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax on the shareholders of such corporation. Applied
in Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 63 S. Ct.
843, 87 L. Ed. 1086 (1943).
125. Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 772,777 (6th Cir. 1948), citing
Paul v. Cullum, 132 U.S. 539, 10 S.Ct. 151, 33 L. Ed. 430 (1889) ;
Williams v. Penderson, 47 Wash. 472, 92 Pac. 287, 17.L.R.A. (N.S.)
384,391 (1907).
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not pause to leave an example.2 6 Shortly after this admission, the Court then came forth in Canfield v. Commissioner"27 and, after pointing out that if a partnership is found to
exist, the agreement on which it is based must be respected,
stated, "In the circumstances of this case the Tax Court
had no lawful right for income tax purposes to make a new
contract for the parties.'".2 [Italics supplied.] It is important to note that no evidence of a contract between the
parties as to tax responsibility existed and, admittedly, the
placing of a tax burden does not necessitate a change in
contracted distributions of income. In all fairness, it should
be pointed out that the Sixth Circuit's attitude stems from
a common law concept and, in view of the Culbertson "general law" determination, it may be that its consistent refusal
to recognize allocation is justified and in line with the spirit
of the Culbertson decision.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The basic cause of the uncertainty which surrounds the
field of family partnerships stems from the wide factual
variance presented by these partnerships. The type of business involved, the importance of capital and services, the
demand for managerial ability, and countless smaller indicia of partnership existence, present a complexity which
does not lend itself to a cut and dried approach. The Tax
Court's formulistic approach to the problem resulted in a
judicial lashing, and a legislative attempt to affect a similar
approach has progressed little since its formulation in 1947.
Thus the significance and necessity of the broad generalities of "intent" and
"reality" advanced by the Culbertson
29
case became clear.

126. Woosley v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 330, 333 (6th Cir. 1948), reversing a Tax Court allocation that was based solely on the amount
of capital contributed. The Court found that the original partnership agreement as to distribution was controlling.
127. 168 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948). The Tax Court allocated 75% of the
partnership to the husband's services, leaving the remaining 25%
to be divided between him and his wife on the basis of capital
contributed by each.
128. Id. at 913.
129. "It is probable that some private practitioners and Treasury representatives will be disappointed with the Culbertson opinion be-
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The effect of this approach is to leave sufficient discretion
in the Tax Court to thwart sham transactions and yet show
a new liberality toward the business-formulated partnerships. Nevertheless, the Tax Court, with its ability to render conclusive its findings of fact, is still in a position to
effect post -Tower results through a Culbertson approach ;130
in view of this it is gratifying to note the decided liberality
reflected in the post-Culbertson decisions by that Court.
The recognition of general law as the controlling factor
in a tax matter is no doubt a bitter pill to some students of
taxation' but the wedding of these factions has been skillfully accomplished by the Supreme Court. Admittedly it is
a more plausible answer than legislation, and the essence
of its result is to place partnership arrangements in the
"same boat"' ' for business and tax purposes.
cause it leaves so many uncertainties in the field. In fairness to
the Court, it should be acknowledged that these, at least, are not
esoteric uncertainties but are those which generally result from
the application of the principles of the Clifford case to transfers
of ownership of income producing property or the principle of
Lucas v. Earl to assignments of future income." Thrower, Culbertson-A Return to Normalcy in Family Partnerships, 12 GA.
B. J. 7, 9 (1949).
130. In view of the hostility of the Tax Court to family partnerships,
some benefit may be gained by foregoing appeals to that tribunal.
Appeals made to the District Courts, as revealed from a survey
of the partnership cases decided there, result in a more favorable
treatment of the taxpayer. This may result from the admitted
leniency of a jury trial as well as possibly from the inability of
these courts to completely separate within their thinking the conflicting doctrines of common law and tax law.
131. "Taxation will not be the practical matter it is so often said to be
until it develops a ruthless capacity to disregard the empty legal.
isms and the ecomic pretenses of the family partnership .
in favor of the facts of family life." Paul, Partnershipsin Tax
Avoidance, 13 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121 (1945).
132. "In plain English, if an arrangement among men is not an arrangement which puts them all in the same business boat, then
they cannot get into the same boat merely to seek the benefits of
§§ 181 and 182. But if they are in the same business boat, although
they may have varying rewards and varied responsibilities, they
do not cease to be in it when the tax collector appears." See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 1220. (Concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter.)

